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Reverse mergers offer a quick and reliable way to gain ac-
cess to the American capital markets. The ease of a re-
verse merger, however, also provides a loophole for nefari-
ous actors to defraud investors. Despite Chinese compa-
nies systemically utilizing reverse mergers to defraud 
American capital markets of $34 billion between 2007 and 
2010,1 regulation has yet to properly address the issue.  
Regulation changes to protect against fraudulent companies 
listing on American stock exchanges still lack quality control 
measures and differ by market. Without creating a strong set 
of regulations at a congressional level, protecting American 
public exchanges—the NASDAQ and the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE)—from fraudulent actors will be impossible.  
WHAT IS A REVERSE MERGER? 
Reverse mergers are an attractive option for private corpora-
tions to go “public” by acquiring a majority of shares of a pub-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Reverse mergers offer a quick 
method for companies to go 
public. 
 
Between 2007 and 2010, 
Chinese companies used 
reverse mergers to defraud 
investors of $34 billion. 
 
Regulation changes since have 
yet to close major loopholes 
relating to reverse mergers. 
 
The United States Congress 
must enact policy to unify 
market regulations. 
2 lic, often defunct, shell company that is then 
combined with the private firm to form a 
single entity. 
In simple terms, a private company buys a 
public shell company in order to gain the 
shell company’s listing on a major stock ex-
change. Some shell companies are created 
with the sole purpose of seeking a reverse 
merger. Consequently, the two firms ex-
change shares, dumping that of the shell 
company, and become one firm which is 
then listed on the stock exchange.  
By pursuing a reverse merger, private com-
panies bypass the regulatory labyrinth asso-
ciated with an initial public offering (IPO). 
Therefore, they tend to be more cost-
efficient and less time-consuming, taking 
anywhere from a few weeks to four months 
in some cases to complete. Also, reverse 
mergers present private companies with 
more alternatives for financing in the future 
and provide greater liquidity. 
Reverse mergers, however, present a variety 
of risks for investors. If not properly audited 
by credible firms, hidden liabilities may in-
crease the chance of fraud. A well-respected, 
transparent shell company is imperative for 
an effective reverse merger so the company 
can build the value of its stock. 
Completing a reverse merger provides an 
easy route for international companies to 
get listed on an American exchange. Lax reg-
ulations, however, make it easy for compa-
nies to defraud investors through the re-
verse merger process. For example, limited 
access to records and lenient auditing guide-
lines provide an easy route for companies to 
masquerade behind fraudulent disclosures 
when completing the reverse merger pro-
cess.  
CHINA’S SYSTEMIC USE OF REVERSE 
MERGERS  
Chinese companies view a reverse merger as 
preferable to initial public offerings (IPOs) 
since they offer a more viable route to the 
American capital market.2 This is because 
Chinese companies typically encounter diffi-
culties when pursuing an IPO. 
Chinese companies tend to fare well after 
finalizing a reverse merger since they tend 
to “be better capitalized, have more positive 
operating cash flows, and are more likely to 
be categorized as a growth or mature stage 
firm,” and have lower leverage than their 
American counterparts before starting the 
reverse merger process.3 Therefore, a ma-
jority tend to move up in their exchange tier 
or are highly profitable.  
Despite such promising prospects, not all 
Chinese companies are what they seem 
when pursuing a reverse merger. In 2010, 
Muddy Waters, an investment research firm, 
released a report accusing Orient Paper of 
In simple terms, a private 
company buys a public 
shell company in order to 
gain the shell company’s 
listing on a major stock 
exchange 
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overstating its revenue by 40%, overvaluing 
its assets, and overstating its gross profit 
margin.4 Two years later, Orient Paper 
agreed to a $2 million settlement in damages 
for defrauding American investors. 
The story of Orient Paper is far from being a 
singular incident. In the two years after the 
Orient Paper case, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) initiated fraud 
investigations and halted the public trading 
of shares associated with 41 Chinese compa-
nies who listed on an American stock ex-
change via reverse merger. By 2011, at least 
33 class action lawsuits against Chinese re-
verse mergers were filed.5 Several Chinese 
companies effectively used reverse mergers 
to defraud investors of close to $34 billion 
by systematically misreporting their finan-
cial assets on official SEC filings.  
HAS POLICY CHANGED? 
In 2010, the SEC launched an initiative to 
pinpoint certain companies with foreign op-
erations, including reverse mergers that re-
sulted in the halting of trade for more than 
35 companies with foreign operations.6 Also, 
the SEC warned investors of the risks of 
dealing with reverse mergers by enacting 
new regulations, including increased filing 
requirements, maintenance of share price, 
and a seasoning period.7 Reverse mergers, 
however, are typically excluded from these 
rules if they meet certain requirements, rais-
ing concern about the effectiveness of these 
rules.  
In November of 2011, the SEC approved 
“seasoning” regulations by NASDAQ and the 
NYSE that outlined stricter listing require-
ments for private companies. First, a compa-
ny must maintain a minimum closing price 
of at least $4 prior to submitting a listing 
application and prior to approval. Second, 
companies must trade on American over-the
-counter (OTC) markets for at least one year. 
Finally, companies must adhere to slightly 
stronger filing requirements that differ by 
exchange. These requirements are outlined 
in the table below. However, if a company 
wishing to trade on the market is worth $40 
million or more, it does not have to meet any 
of these requirements.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
While new regulations enacted by the 
NASDAQ and NYSE make it easier for the 
SEC to catch and reprimand reverse mergers 
for fraud, they simply do not go far enough. 
Differences in filing requirements and over-
all lack of quality control still allow some 
fraudulent reverse mergers to list on Ameri-
can markets. From 2018 to 2019, the SEC 
settled multiple criminal lawsuits, resulting 
in over 30 criminal charges of wire fraud 
and conspiracy, for orchestrated schemes to 
fraudulently boost the stock of reverse mer-
ger companies to siphon millions of dollars 
from American capital markets.8  
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Table 1: New Seasoning Regulations in 2011 
Source: Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP9  
Requirement NASDAQ NYSE 
$4 closing price  30 of the last 
60 trading days  
30 of the last 
60 trading days  
Trade on OTC 
markets  
1 year prior to 
listing  
1 year prior to 
listing  
Additional Fi-
nancial Re-
porting  
Two recent 
financial state-
ments  
Form 8-K in-
cluding all au-
dited state-
ments  
A better solution is for Congress to update the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by introducing 
comprehensive quality control regulations on 
reverse mergers. New legislation must include 
a $4 closing price minimum during the listing 
process and for at least one year after listing, 
removal of the $40 million loophole, demon-
strated ability to sustain growth for at least 
two years after listing, and standardization of 
filing requirements through all American ex-
change markets. Under this legislation, com-
panies’ financial statements must be ap-
proved by an American auditing agency prior 
to officially listing. By enacting the legislation 
outlined above, Congress can ensure quality 
control to protect American exchange mar-
kets from reverse merger fraud.  
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